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Are Business Cycles Symmetric?
ABSTRACT—1--
The dating of peaks and troughs and the concommitant emphasis on the
different qualitative mechanisms involved in cyclical expansions and contractions
have been major features of the NBER program on business cycle research.
Asymmetry between expansions and contractions has long been a focus of such
business cycle research. Thus Wesley Mitchell wrote in 1927, "the most violent
declines exceed the most considerable advances... . Businesscontractions appear
to be a briefer and more violent process than business expansions." Keynes wrote
in the General Theory that "the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency
often takes place suddenly and violently .. . nosuch sharp turning point occurs
when an upward is substituted for a downward tendency." Indeed, Neftci (1984)
states that "the claim that major economic time series are asymmetric over
different time phases of the business cycle arises in almost all major works on
business cycles."
In many respects the techniques of modern statistics and econometrics surely
supersede earlier methods of cyclical analysis. They make possible the application
of techniques of statistical estimation and inference. They remove the need for
judgment in data description. And they provide a rigorous basis for non-judgmental
forecasting. Yet, statistical models of the sort used in economics--whether built in
the structural spirit of the Cowles Commission or in the more modern time series
tradition--are entirely unable to capture cyclical asymmetries.If, as Keynes,
Mitchell, and others believed, cyclical asymmetries are of fundamental
importance, then standard statistical techniques are seriously deficient. Something
like traditional business cycle analysis may then be necessary to provide an
adequate empirical basis for theorizing about cyclical behavior.
Hence, the question of the magnitude of cyclical asymmetries seems to be of
substantial methodological importance. Yet, with the exception of the work of
Neftci (1984), it appears to have attracted relatively little attention. This paper—2—
examines the extent of cyclical asymmetries using American data for thepre-war
and post-war periods and data on five other major OECD nations for thepost-war
period. We find no evidence of asymmetry in the behavior of GNP or industrial
production. For the U.S. only, we find evidence of some asymmetry in the behavior
of unemployment. We conclude that asymmetry is probably not aphenomenon of
first order importance in understanding business cycles. Itappears that there is
not much basis for preferring some version of traditional cyclicaltechniques of
analysis and forecasting to more modern statistical methods.
Section II of this note describes our methods andpresents the results of our
analysis of GNP and industrial production. Section III follows Neftci (1984) in
considering unemployment. We note some methodological problems we have with
his analysis and then show that his conclusions about the behavior ofunemployment
appear to be invalid outside the U.S. Section IV provides some brief conclusions.—3—
II. Asymmetries in put?
Theessenceof the claims of Keynes and Mitchell quoted in theprevious
section was that economic downturns are brief andsevere relative to trend, while
upturns are longer and more gradual. This hypothesis hasa clear implication:
there should be significant skewness in afrequency distribution of periodic growth
rates of output. That is, the distribution should havesignificantly fewer than half
its observations below its mean; and theaverage deviation from the mean of the
observations below the mean should besignificantly more than the average
deviation of the observations above the mean. The medianoutput growth rate
should exceed the mean by a significant amount.Figure 1 depicts the predicted
frequency distribution of output growth under the null hypothesis ofsymmetry and
under the alternative hypothesis of Keynes and Mitchell.
Our procedure is simple: it is to calculate the coefficient ofskewness of the
distribution of output growth rates for a variety ofoutput measures and time
intervals. The coefficient of skewness is definedas the ratio of the third centered
moment to the cube of the standard deviation. For asymmetric distribution, the
coefficient of skewness is zero, and the mean equals the median.
Evaluation of the statistical significance ofany measured deviations from
symmetry clearly requires an estimate of the sampling variability in our estimates
of skewness. Standard statistical works suchas Kendall and Stuart (1969) note that
under the null hypothesis of zero skewness, the estimated skewnessof a set of n
independent random normal observations is normally distributed witha standard
error of (6/n). Unfortunately, the observations on growth rates considered here
are highly serially correlated, and so tlìis formula is inapplicable. We therefore
used the following Monte Carlo procedure for each series andsiimpIe period
considered.First, a third-order autoregressive process was esthnatedfor00
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the timeseriesof growth rates. It was then used to generate 300 artificial series
for the sample period undertheassumption that the shocks to the autoregressive
process were normally distributed. The standard deviation of the estimated
skewness under the null hypothesis was then used calculated as the standard
deviation of the skewnesses of the artificially generated series.1
Table 1 presents some evidence on skewness in quarterly and annual growth
rates of U.S. GNP and industrial production for various sample periods. We use
industrial production as well as GNP because the latter contains a greater number
of imputed series, and because cyclicality is most apparent in the manufacturing
sector of the economy. Because quarterly data is complicated by the need for
seasonal adjustment and by high-frequency movements that might render existing
skewness undetectable, both annual and quarterly data are examined.
Very little evidence of significant asymmetries emerges. Before World War
II, quarterly GNP growth rates exhibit positive skewness, the opposite of that
implied by the hypotheses of Keynes and Mitchell. The failure of the steep 1929-
1933 decline to dominate the interwar period is somewhat surprising. We expected
significant skewness to be most apparent around the Great Depression. Similar
conclusions are obtained with annual GNP data and with data on annual industrial
production for the pre-war period. Asymmetries do not appear to be substantial
enough to be important. The difference between the median and mean growth
rates reaches a maximum of .3% using quarterly data on industrial production for
the post-war period. This difference is only 2% of the inter-quartile range of the
distribution of quarterly growth rates: it is a very small number.
There is a little bit of evidence in favor of skewness in post-war data. All
the estimated skewnesses are negative, as predicted by Keynes and Mitchell. In
the case of annual GNP data, the estimated skewness approaches statistical
significance. However, no equivalent result is found with either quarterly GNP or—6—
Table 1.
Skewness of U.S. GNP and Industrial Production Growth Rates
Annual Data Quarterly Data
Standard Standard
Variable Period Skewness Error Skewness Error
GNP 1891—1915 —.47 .73 .55 .29
GNP 1923—1940 —.70 1.12 .04 .42
GNP 1949—1983 —1.37 .74 —.33 .29
IP 1949—1983 —.55 .68 —.58 .40
Data from Gordon (1982) and from the 1984 Business Conditions
Digest.—7—
annual industrial production data.Hence we are inclined to discount its
significance. It is of course possible that with longer time series significant
asymmetries would emerge—the estimate of skewness would become sharper. But
as Figure 2 reveals, the observed skewness does not appear to be substantively
important. The naked eye cannot easily judge the direction of asymmetry.
As a further check, Table 2 reports estimated skewnesses of quarterly GNP
and industrial production for other major OECD countries for the post-war period.
Skewness is noticeably negative for only two of the five countries--for only Canada
and lapan--using either industrial production or GNP data. There is no significant
evidence of asymmetry for any country. The only natural grouping suggested by
the data is a possible division into the U.S., Canada, and 3apan on the one hand and
the U.K., France, and West Germany on the other. But this possible difference
between "non-European" and "European" business cycles is not strongly enough
present in the data to give us any confidence that it is anything more than the
workings of chance.
How has the picture of recessions as short violent interruptions of the process
of economic growth emerged? Part of the answer lies in the way economic data
are frequently analyzed. Figures 3 and 4 depict the NBER reference cycles and
growth cycles of the post-war period. Using reference cycles, contractions are
definitely shorter than expansions, confirming the judgments of Keynes and
Mitchell. But this is a statistical artifact. The superposition of the business cycle
upon a trend of economic growth implies that only the most severe portions of the
declines relative to trend will appear as absolute declines and thus as reference
cycle contractions. Even a symmetric business cycle superimposed on a rising
trend would generate reference cycles for which the recessions would be short and
severe relative to trend, even though the growth cycles--the cycles in detrended
indices--would be symmetric. As this argument suggests, there is little difference—8—
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Table 2
Skewness of Quarterly Changes in GNP
and Industrial Production
1950—1979
md. Pdn. GNP
Country Skéwnéss S.E. Skewness S.E.
U.S. —.61 .42 —.33 .29
Japan —.66 .40 —.43 .29
Canada -.52 .39 -.42 .30
W. Germany —.01 .34 -.11 .26
U.K. .13 .35 .6]. .27
France .27 .33 —.03 .24
Data from the OECD Historical Statistics and from the
1984BusinessConditions Digest.Figure 3
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between the lengths of growth cycle expansions and contractions. The difference
in length between expansions and contractions for the nine growth cycles averaged
.9 quarters; the standard deviation of this estimate of the average is 1.4 quarters.2
By contrast, the average length of the seven reference cycle expansions was 11.4
quarters longer than the length of the subsequent contractions.3
We conclude from this investigation that once one takes proper account of
trend growth--either using our skewness-based approach or the traditional NBER
cycle-dating approach--little evidence of cyclical asymmetry in the behavior of
output remains. The impression to the contrary that we used to hold seems to
result from a failure to take account either impressionistically or quantitatively of
the effects of long-run economic growth. Few extant theories suggest that
business cycles should depend on the rate of underlying growth of either
productivity or population.4The next section considers whether similar
conclusions are obtained using data on unemployment.13—
III.AsymmetriesinUnemployment?
Ourconclusions so far contradict those of Neftci (1984), who examines the
behavior of the unemployment rate and finds evidence against the null of symmetry
at the .80 level.Neftci's statistical procedure seems inappropriate to us:
eliminating the quantitative information in the data by reducing it to a series of l's
(unemployment increasing) and 0's (unemployment decreasing) cannot lead to a test
of maximum power.
Table 3 presents estimates of the skewness in detrended unemployment rates
for the U.S. and other major OECD countries for the post-war period. We examine
only the post-war data because earlier unemployment estimates are, in general, not
derived independently from output data.For the U.S., we confirm Neftci's
conclusion. Indeed, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry at the
.95 level. Annual data suggest as much skewness as quarterly data, but the
skewness in annual data is not statistically significant.
None of the other OECD countries, however, have statistically significant
skewnesses in their detrended unemployment rates.5 This suggests that skewness
in the U.S. is either a statistical accident or a result of a peculiarity in the U.S.
labor market. Asymmetry in changes in unemployment rates is not a strong
general feature of business cycles.
We have briefly attempted to examine the reasons for asymmetry in
American unemployment rates. Skewness does not arise from the behavior of labor
force participation: labor force participation rates exhibit no noticeable skewness,
and skewness is present in detrended unemployment numbers as strongly as in
detrended unemployment rates. Moreover, quarterly changes in employment over
the 1949-1982 period exhibit a skewness coefficient of -1.90, significant at the .95
level. Skewness in employment and unemployment but not in GNP clearly indicates
a breakdown in Okun's law. In figure 5, inverted deviations of industrial production—14—
Table 3
Skewness of Quarterly Changes in Unemployment Rates
1950—1979
Country SkewnessStandard Error
U.S. 1.02 .30
Japan .40 .28
Canada .55 .29
W. Germany-.13 .27
U.K. .27 .30
France .14 .33
Data from the 1984 Business Conditions Digest.a)
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fromtrend are plotted alongside the detrended unemployment rate. At business
cycle peaks—unemployment troughs—the unemployment rate lags behindoutput
measures. Output measures start to decline relative to trend before unemployment
starts to rise. There is a period of time, after the growth cycle peak and before
the reference cycle peak, during which output is falling relative to trend and
employment is still rising relative to trend. This discrepancy in timingappears only
near business cycle peaks. At business cycle troughs, the unemployment rate peaks
within one quarter of the trough of output measures.
The significant coefficient of skewness found in the U.S. unemployment rate
is apparently another manifestation of the "end of expansion" productivity effect
documented in Gordon (1979). According to Gordon, normal equations forraw
labor productivity go awry in the quarters afteroutput reaches its maximum
relative to trend. The magnitude of this effect can be seen in Gordon'sfigure 1
(reprinted as figure 6). Output has begun to fall relative to trend; employment is
still rising relative to trend; and so raw labor productivitynaturally declines
sharply. Firms are able to expand their work forces rapidly after business cycle
troughs in order to keep pace with rising aggregate demand. Why don't they
contract their work forces relative to trend after growth cycle peaks? Wesuspect
that there is an explanation related to the burgeoning literature on laborhoarding
(see Medoff and Fay (19S3) or Fair (1984), for example), but it isbeyond our
competence to suggest here what the explanation might be.Figure 6
Output per Hour in the Nonfarin Business Sector,
Actual and Predicted from Alternative Equations
1969:2—1979:3
Reprinted from Gordon (1979)
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*peak of real over potential output—18—
IV. Conclusion
Our investigationinto the possible asymmetry of the business cycle has, in
our estimation, failed to turn up significant evidence that the econometric model-
building approach to business cycles is misguided. We could not find the skewness
coefficients that we had thought we would find; and we therefore conclude that it
is reasonable to, in a first approximation, model business cycles as symmetric
oscillations about a rising trend. GNP growth rates and industrial production
growth rates do not provide significant evidence of asymmetry. We therefore think
that the main advantage of the econometric model-building approach—the body of
statistical theory behind it--makes it the methodology of choice for analyzing
macroeconomic fluctuations.
Our results call into question at least one possible justification for using
reference cycles in studying macroeconomic fluctuations.An alternative
justification for the reference-cycle approach stresses the commonality of the
patterns of comovements in variables across different business cycles. Blanchard
and Watson's paper in this volume challenges this proposition.Studies of
macroeconomic fluctuations using the reference-cycle approach are the foundation
of empirical macroeconomics. But, given the availability of modern statistical
methods, there appears to be no scientific basis for the use of reference cycles in
either macroeconomic analysis or forecasting.As yet, no phenomenon or
regularity has been adduced which can be studied using the reference-cycle
approach, but is inconsistent with the assumptions of standard time series methods.
Until such a demonstration is provided, there is little justification for the
continued use of reference cycles in studying or forecasting macroeconomic
fluctuations.—19—
Notes
1.We verified that the estimated skewnesseswere approximately normally
distributed. Coefficients of kurtosis were less than tenpercent away from
their value of three under the nullhypothesis. Note that our test of
asymmetry is appropriate if output is stationary either when detrended or
when differenced. Our standard errorsare calculated under the second
assumption, which is weakly supported by Nelson and Plosser (1982). Because
they include periods in their analysis like the Great Depression and WorldWar
I! during which no one would expect theunderlying rate of growth of the
economy to stay constant, it is hard to interpret how their warnings against
the practice of detrending apply to analyses that dealonly with periods for
which one has good reason to suspect that theunderlying growth of potential
output has been approximately constant.
For the U.S. industrial production index, estimated skewnessesfor sub-
periods of the post-World War II period are very variable--more variable than
the stochastic errors calculated under theassumption of an AR(3) generating
process would suggest. Apparently, modelling the generating process as an
AR(3) does not capture all of the serial dependence in theseries and leads to
estimated standard errors that are presumably too low.Therefore the
standard errors reported in this paper are probably below their actualvalues.
2.Assuming that each post-war business cycle is an independent draw froma
population characterized partly by the difference in length between the
expansion and the recession phase. Cycle dates are taken from Moore and
Zarnowitz's "The Development and Role of the National Bureau's Business
Cycle Chronologies." Note that, as Moore and Zarnowitzreport, it was not
always the case that expansions were as a rule longer than contractions.—20--
3.With a standard error of the mean of 3.3quarters. Excluding the highly
anomalous 1961-1970 reference cycle, the mean difference is 8.1quarters
and its standard error is 1.8 quarters.
4.But see Schumpeter (1939) for arguments that thecyclical variance of output
is itself positively related to the rate of long-rungrowth.
5.DetrendingEuropean unemployment rates is not easy: there appears to have
been an enormous rise in structural unemployment rates allover Europe in
the last ten years. The results reported used a seconddegree polynomial to
detrend the data. The results were effectively unchanged whena third or a
fourth degree polynomial was used, or when a piecewise linear trend witha
breakpoint in 1973 was used.If the rise in unemployment is attributed
entirely to cyclical factors--if the skewness of raw changes is calculated--
then changes in European unemployment rates since 1970appear strongly
skew.—21—
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